We need to talk: How to build a floor under Sino-Israeli relationship
Discourse Power | June 7, 2024
Greetings from Jerusalem,
My country is still at war, and I still don't have much time to write regularly, but I wanted to share some thoughts with you.
I recently visited Shanghai and Beijing with my colleagues from the Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation Israel-China Policy Center, INSS. It was the first time I went since COVID-19, and we had the opportunity to meet with prominent academics and think-tankers specializing in Middle Eastern studies.
Some of them are reading Discourse Power, so I’d like to extend my thanks here for their gracious hospitality and candid conversations. It was good to be back.
While we were there, China hosted Arab League foreign ministers and other leaders for the 10th China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF). Naturally, the ongoing war in the Middle East was at the top of the agenda.
Below is my quick take.
But, first, some new Substack recommendations from two brilliant friends and mentors:
- is a newsletter by Ari Ben-Am, with a focus on influence and information operations, cyber, and OSINT. Due to the subject matter, China, Russia, and Iran are frequently covered, which should be of great interest to many of you. Ari offers insightful breakdowns of new reports as well as fantastic analyses.
- - A great new addition to this space by Atlantic Council Global China Hub colleague Professor . It has only recently been released, but it has quickly become an indispensable source of news and insights.
Thank you to all new and old readers, and if you find this newsletter useful, please share it with your friends and colleagues.
Tuvia
We need to talk: How to build a floor under Sino-Israeli relationship
To preserve its relations with Israel, contribute to regional stability, and remain a relevant player in the "day after”, Beijing should prioritize direct communication with Israel over populist statements about it
by Tuvia Gering
Following the October 7 massacre and invasion, Israel has been engaged in two types of wars: an armed struggle and the battle for hearts and minds.
Fariz Mehdawi, the Palestinian ambassador to China, recognizes the significance of discourse power: "Public opinion is more important than any army, air force, or bombs... [it] gives us the resilience to go to the end."
Mehdawi was speaking with a reporter from China Daily, a platform overseen by the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party, on the sidelines of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) held last week in Beijing.
CASCF has been held every two years since 2004, alternately in Beijing and an Arab capital, and is attended by the foreign ministers of the PRC and the twenty-two Arab League member states, as well as the organization's secretary.
Using the forum as a state visit, the presidents of Egypt, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates were also present, along with the King of Bahrain. CASCF is frequently accompanied by a flurry of bilateral meetings between incoming dignitaries and Chinese leaders, after which eyewatering memorandums of understanding (MoUs) are signed.
A Chinese participant told Prof.
that "there's a fatigue among Arab governments in signing endless empty MoUs with China." Among the highlights were China's upgrading of relations with Bahrain to a "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" (CSP) and Tunisia to a "Strategic Partnership," as well as increased defense cooperation between China and the UAE.In his keynote speech, President Xi Jinping outlined five "frameworks" for future cooperation: innovation, investments and financing, energy, trade, and people-to-people ties.
The Chinese leader also called for an international peace conference to end the conflict in Gaza and promised to donate 500 million yuan ($69 million) in humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip and another 3 million dollars to UNRWA on top of the 100 million yuan ($13.8 million) China had provided.
The event culminated with three declarations: the first summarized the work of CASCF's nineteen working mechanisms and the second set a three-year action plan (2024-2026) on a wide range of issues.
The third is a joint Chinese-Arab statement on the "Palestinian question." In addition to understandable words of solidarity with the Gazans, it includes a litany of explicit condemnations of Israel and the United States, as well as praise for the various Arab countries for their "contribution" to the Palestinian cause.
Among the twenty-one clauses of the statement, China and the Arab countries "condemn Israel's aggression," oppose forced displacement of the Palestinian population, and call on the Security Council to pass a binding resolution requiring Israel to cease fire.
The statement also condemns the US for vetoing Palestine's admission as a state to the United Nations in April, and it supports South Africa's lawsuit against Israel for "violating the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide."
"As the occupying power," it states, "Israel is responsible for the dire humanitarian conditions in Gaza." According to the statement, a prerequisite for regional peace and stability is the end of Israeli “occupation" of the territory of the State of Palestine, whose capital is East Jerusalem, the occupied Syrian Golan Heights, and the Lebanese territories.
The parties also supported the convening of the international peace conference mentioned by Xi. They called for the establishment of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital while recognizing the "right of return and compensation for Palestinian refugees."
Needless to say, the statement makes no mention of the October 7 massacre, the responsibility of the Palestinians, Iran, and its "axis of resistance"; nor does it call for the release of the hostages, an end to terrorism, or the plight of more than a hundred thousand displaced Israelis.
Hamas is only hinted at in a bilateral recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole political representative of the Palestinians and a call for all Palestinian factions to unite under its banner.
The Arab Lobby
To understand China's anti-Israel bias, a closer look at the platform is necessary.
This year's CASCF commemorated the 20th anniversary of its founding. China had established similar forums with Central Asian countries and Russia (SCO), seven Portuguese-speaking countries (Macao Forum), and the African Union (FOCAC).
Following CASCF, additional forums were established with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (China-CEEC) and Latin America and the Caribbean (China-CELAC).
What appears to be a Chinese initiative likely originated with the Arab League, as outlined by Prof. Dawn Murphy in China's Rise in the Global South. Arab and Chinese officials and scholars told her that the League wished to strengthen its member states' coordination with the Chinese superpower in areas such as trade, investment, regional security, and regional politics.
True to its United Front roots, the Chinese Communist Party gradually co-opted the various forums and began to lead them as the primary platform for "strategic guidance" in managing its relations with different parts of the world.
Against the backdrop of China’s strategic competition with the “US-led West,” which intensified with Russia's invasion of Ukraine, China officially adopted the concept of the "Global South" last year to describe these regions.
In line with Xi's call to "seize control over the power of discourse," China appointed itself as "the voice of the Global South," a "friend, brother, and partner" who upholds the interests of the developing countries, the Arab and Muslim worlds, as well as the "coalition of the oppressed" by Western colonialism and hegemony.
Meetings like CASCF have become a central platform for China to market itself as a "new type of major power" - unlike the hegemonic West, China claims to have good relations with all conflicting sides in the region; it emphasizes it has never invaded other countries, does not interfere in internal affairs over human rights and despotism, and offers economic opportunities “with no strings attached.”
However, reading the fine print reveals that there are some strings attached. To reap the benefits, China demands support for its "core interests," such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, and the South China Sea, as well as non-interference with its human rights violations.
For seven years, the United States and its partners have led an international opprobrium and sanctions for China's "crimes against humanity" and "genocide" against Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. The "Halal" stamp granted during the CASCF by the Muslim world defangs the allegations.
Furthermore, China and Arab countries' support for the lawsuit against Israel's "genocide" of Palestinians casts a negative light on the US's decision to arm Israel. America is not concerned with the human rights of Muslim minorities, the logic goes - it only seeks to contain China.
Beijing’s desire for the Arab bloc to speak with one voice against Western hegemony presents a challenge, as it is notoriously divided. Not only the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but also the civil wars in Syria, Yemen, and Libya, Qatar's support for terrorism, and attitudes toward Iran have reduced the Arab League to a contentious "talking shop."
As a result, the Palestinian issue serves as the lowest common denominator. A Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) scholar interviewed for Murphy's chapter on CASCF stated in 2010, "To support Palestine is to support the Arab world.”
Back in 2017, Prof. Yang Chen of Shanghai University wrote: “Supporting Palestine is an international political correctness. Only one country in the world supports Israel, and that is the US.”
Nowadays, Jerusalem is more isolated than it has been in recent memory, and Beijing senses that America's steadfast support drags them both to the ground.
Beijing recognized Arab anti-Israeli sentiment as early as the 1950s as a means of winning friends and influence in its ideological battle with the US (and Soviet Union). Although Israel and China established diplomatic relations in 1992, as long as the conflict remains unresolved, China wishes to carry on this tradition.
Singapore-based ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s 2024 survey in April indicated a shift in preferences, with a slight majority of Southeast Asians favoring China over the US. This marks the first time China has surpassed the US in the annual survey since its inception in 2020.
"To some extent, damage to America's international reputation caused by the Gaza conflict is no less than the Iraq war," according to Wu Xinbo, dean of the School of International Studies at Fudan University.
The survey found that respondents were most concerned about the Gaza War (46.5%), followed by "aggressive behavior in the South China Sea" (39.9%) and the two-year war between Russia and Ukraine (39.4%).
This is all the motivation China and Russia need to mobilize their propaganda arms to focus on Palestinian suffering as a diversion from Chinese bullying of the Philippines and Putin's war of aggression.
A March poll in four Arab states saw the decline of Biden's favorability rating to 21.7%, well below that of Xi Jinping and half that of Putin, according to the Washington-based Mideast news site Al-Monitor.
The Arab lobby uses CASCF to increase international pressure on Israel. For those who normalized relations with Israel, this is a means for countries to absolve their break from Arab solidarity to audiences at home and among their peers. Meanwhile, the anti-Zionist camp would seize any opportunity to proclaim, "A Curse Upon the Jews, Victory to Islam."
With the world's second-largest economy and a permanent UN Security Council on their side, the Palestinians are emboldened to maintain their hardline position. Don't take my word for it; instead, listen to Abbas Zaki, a Fatah Central Committee member in charge of the Palestinian Authority’s ties with the PRC.
“Do not forget the emerging camp, which is on your side—the Chinese camp. China is going to lead the world,” Zaki said in an Arabic interview with Palestine TV in 2021. "If tomorrow we decide to be stubborn, and demand [a free Palestine] the [Jordan] River to the [Mediterranean] Sea [i.e., free of Israeli existence] —it would be fine with [the Chinese]. But they know us, and they know that we are not suicidal and that we want to make Israel swallow the poison one drop at a time.”
Murphy documented that the joint statements against it have become increasingly blatant every two years.
For example, the third forum in 2008 made the first mention of "ceasing the occupation," including in the Golan and Lebanon; in 2010, despite Chinese concerns, the statement mentioned "settlements" in East Jerusalem; in 2012, support was added to Palestine's membership in the UN and UNESCO; and so on.
On the forum's 20th anniversary, the final statement is the most extreme. Given the low point Israel reached following the massacre and the attacks it continues to face on seven fronts (including Syria and Lebanon), it is also the most cynical.
What’s Next for Israel-China Ties
While CASCF was taking place, the author was in Beijing with an INSS delegation, where we met with top research institutes, academics, and local officials.
We showed them a 2019 Pew survey showing that, with 66% of respondents favorably inclined and only 25% negatively, Israel was the most pro-China nation among those surveyed, following only Russia (71%), Nigeria (70%), and Lebanon (68%).
Three years of lockdowns and reduced people-to-people ties between Israel and China did a number on Beijing’s image. In addition, its obfuscation of the origins of COVID and more dire reports from Xinjiang, as well as a deterioration in its relations with Washington all had an impact on its image in Israel, with negative views rising to 46% in 2023.
China's complete lack of empathy for Israel and its cynical exploitation of Israeli suffering have only worsened the negative trend, as a recent poll by my colleagues reveals:
“According to the findings, the majority of the Israeli public (54%) consider China to be an unfriendly (42%) or hostile (12%) country to Israel. Only a small minority (15%) perceive China as a friendly country or an ally of Israel, while the rest (31%) answered ‘don’t know.’”
Upon hearing these statistics, the common message they asked us to carry back home is that China is "neutral" in the current war and remains interested in maintaining friendly constructive relations with Israel.
A few of them hinted that this is not an accurate portrayal of reality but rather Beijing's wish to preserve the relationship from further damage than it has already sustained.
They pointed out that China supports the two-state solution and, unlike in the 1960s, no longer provides weapons to the Palestinians. However, as Ambassador Mehdawi said, in the war for hearts and minds, China has emerged as a major arms supplier for the opponents of the Jewish state.
Some of our Chinese colleagues told us that they understand how their country's position undermines the historical ties between our nations and China's image as "everyone's friend."
However, as one leading scholar cautioned, as long as the war continues and the rivalry with the United States worsens, Beijing will continue to "use Israel as a stick to beat the Americans." Sadly, I share his pessimism.
“China has little to gain from taking a harder stance on the Israel-Palestine conflict, preferring instead to leverage it to cast Washington in a poor light,“ Prof. Zhang Chuchu told Al-Jazeera in 2021. “The aim is to earn points on the global stage by revealing and criticizing the US’s double standards in the Middle East,” Zhang said.
Jerusalem is also interested in preserving what it can from relations with the world's second-largest economy, but that doesn't mean it should welcome its role as a battering ram.
The first step in "building a floor" beneath the spiraling relationships is for Israel to define its red lines, something China excels at when it comes to its own "core interests." Based on the experiences of other small nations, Israel needs to steer clear of confrontational actions that could surprise the Chinese and spark public arguments.
This may be why Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Israel Katz have yet to react to China's anti-Israel stance. Yet, it does not help either that they have yet to speak with their counterparts.
Israeli officials must contact China as soon as possible and explain how its "Cold War mentality" undermines three decades of bilateral relations, affects regional stability, normalizes terrorism, and jeopardizes the peace process.
China, for its part, should also reach out to Israel. Since the war began, only one Chinese official has visited the country. According to our interlocutors, a "travel warning" issued by Beijing prohibits any Chinese government workers, including the majority of scholars, from visiting.
In addition, Beijing could take a cue from India and adopt a principled stance against Hamas terrorism. However, after eight months of war, and with China hosting the group last month and again this month, it's unlikely that they'll abandon their double standards anytime soon. "It's about saving face," a scholar told me.
I would argue, nevertheless, that a call between Xi Jinping and Israeli President Isaac Herzog expressing empathy for Israeli suffering - even while sympathizing with the Palestinians - calling for the release of hostages, and highlighting the positive China-Israel relationship would earn China substantial goodwill in Israel without costing it anything in the Arab and Muslim world.
Such a humanitarian gesture would also signal to China's foreign policy and propaganda apparatus the importance of moderating their confrontational approach.
The Middle East is at a crossroads: facing the threat of all-out war in Lebanon and regional chaos, or the prospect of Israeli-Saudi normalization and a new security architecture against Iran's "axis of resistance".
To preserve its relations with Israel, contribute to regional stability, and remain a relevant player in the "day after”, Beijing should prioritize direct communication with Israel over populist statements about it.
Discourse Power is written by Tuvia Gering, a researcher at the Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation Israel-China Policy Center at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) and a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Any views expressed in this newsletter, as well as any errors, are solely those of the author. Follow Tuvia on X @GeringTuvia
We merely WISH to have honesty, empathy, and communication from China. Feelings, wishful thinking, and lack of strategy and leverage is a road to incomprehensible ruin.
1. Strategy runs through China-UAE > China-Iran. Same with Saudis.
https://chinamenanewsletter.substack.com/p/632024
2. And where the battle seems to be completely lost is on social media. What kind of intelligence services manage to lose so badly on social media 15+ years into its existence, 8 years post-Brexit/Bernie/MAGA? That's where the biggest failure continues. to. this. day!
3. Gonna have to get a lot more forward thinking to recover and get ahead, now.
- paper Tiger in Iran.
- political "images" and caricatures.
and a lot more.
Addressing the congress is perhaps 25-50 years out of date AND sure to backfire. Decision makers seem to be completely out of touch with the West's wokeness monster reality, social media, and genAI.