The Mission of the Historian
Discourse Power | September 17, 2024
Greetings from Tel Aviv and happy Mid-Autumn Festival,
First off, a professional update: As of this month, I am no longer affiliated with the Israel-China Policy Center at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). It was a privilege to work alongside such talented and brilliant researchers, from whom I learned a great deal. I have since transitioned to a new position in the private sector while continuing to serve as a non-resident fellow with the Atlantic Council's Global China Hub.
On that note, my colleagues Professor
and The Atlantic’s Michael Schuman, published an excellent overview earlier this month on China’s evolving strategic position in the Middle East. They aptly describe this shift as one from 'hedging' to 'wedging.'Having spent the last three months writing it, the original article shared below is the most significant I've written in this year of war. I appreciate you taking the time to read it. Share your thoughts and comments by replying to this email, and consider forwarding Discourse Power to your network and coworkers to support my work. It only takes a minute.
Thank you for reading,
Tuvia
The Mission of the Historian
"A lifetime of unwavering integrity, a compass for the academic world. Rare are those who dare to speak out, yet he never forgot to heed the lessons of history"
by Tuvia Gering
Can the death of a single person alter the course of relations between two countries?
This question crossed my mind when I participated in a June seminar alongside American and Chinese scholars discussing China and the Middle East. During the discussion, a prominent panelist remarked, "Yin Gang of CASS, a dear friend of Israel and critic of Iran, has passed away. Going forward, this will tremendously impact China's views and policies [towards Israel].”
Professor Yin Gang was a distinguished retired scholar of the Middle East at the Institute of West Asian and African Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). Just before the seminar, it was reported that he succumbed to a heart attack on the morning of June 9, aged 73.
Following her remarks, I looked up Yin’s name online. To my surprise, I found that the Israeli embassy in Beijing had deviated from its usual updates on the war in Gaza and the hostages on its Weibo social media account and posted a tribute to the professor.
The embassy’s message acknowledged Yin's contributions to the scholarly field of Middle East studies in China and his "objective stance on regional issues," adding, "We will forever miss Professor Yin Gang, an old friend."
His untimely passing garnered significant public attention. Within a week of his death, the hashtag #YinGangPassedAway #殷罡逝世 amassed a staggering 100 million views on Weibo. Yin, it seemed, was caught in the eye of a viral cyber-storm.
A deeper examination of this tempest reveals a tale much bigger than any one individual - it tells a story of how Chinese media and academic discourse are affected by the great power competition.
Moreover, it demonstrates how public intellectuals in Xi Jinping's China are under growing pressure to toe the party line, often at the expense of their integrity and livelihood.
A Life
"Professor Yin's 'interview' is officially over,” so concluded an obituary by his family.
A trailblazer in Middle Eastern studies, Yin Gang was a popular guest in newsrooms and on talk shows. His soft-spoken manner stood out amid frequent shouting from fellow panelists, giving viewers confidence that he could sort through the region's many intricacies.
But despite a career dating back to the 1980s and hundreds of interviews under his belt, it appears that China will remember him by just one.
A month into the war in Gaza, in mid-November 2023, Yin sat for an interview on Q&A China 问答神州, a talk show produced by state-owned Phoenix TV and hosted by Sally Wu Xiaoli.
Over the course of 25 minutes, Yin and Wu discussed the current war situation, post-war prospects for Gaza, the role of external actors, the future of Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, as well as the outlook for the peace process and regional stability.
As the credits were rolling, Wu asked Yin Gang why he thought it was crucial to take a “detached perspective” (lit. “a cold-eye” 冷眼]) when tracking the Middle East. Yin responded:
"You shouldn't cry when you hear that more than 10,000 civilians died in Gaza, because you may have to drop one zero from that number. Take, for example, the bombing of the Baptist hospital, in which Hamas claimed over 500 lives. I was able to thoroughly examine it, and not one person had died."
Earlier in the show, Yin criticized those who readily accept figures cited by the Hamas-controlled "Health Ministry of Gaza." The Baptist Hospital he mentions is the Al-Ahli Rab Hospital, where on the night of October 17, a bomb exploded in its parking lot, killing Palestinians seeking refuge.
Israel quickly refuted claims that the attack was carried out by the Israel Defense Force (IDF), stating instead that Palestinian Islamic Jihad's rockets aimed at Israeli towns fell short. However, reputable news organizations and human rights groups, as well as the Chinese Foreign Ministry, accepted the terrorist’s account and pointed a finger at Israel.
Yin was correct that, in the following days, more evidence emerged supporting Israeli claims about a misfired rocket. The same news outlets had to backtrack and post corrections (and not for the last time).
Six months after Yin’s interview, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) suddenly and heavily revised its data. OCHA reported 4,959 women and 7,797 children as having died, nearly half of the initial total of 9,500 women and 14,500 children reported as fatalities.
This is still tragic by any standard. It's perplexing that Yin claimed no one died when neither side denied there had been casualties, yet his point about spurious sources and disinformation was vindicated.
“Don't let yourself get emotional. You must focus on the facts,” he cautioned Wu, adding, “When it comes to the Middle East, there are always those who specialize in selling tears and profiting from others' suffering [lit. "drinking human blood" 喝人血]. There is not a single person among them who isn’t a sanctimonious hypocrite 道貌岸然.”
Granted, Yin’s graphic metaphors and analytical approach can come across as indifferent to the intense emotions and profound loss experienced by the Palestinians. Furthermore, the generalization that suffering is exploited seems dismissive of the genuine sorrow and advocacy that many feel toward and do for the Palestinians.
Nonetheless, anyone who knew Yin would describe him as a lifelong peace advocate and a firm believer in the two-state solution, a sharp critic and a friend of both Israel and Palestine.
In the context of the interview, his words reflected his long-held belief that "malign actors" such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Qatar-backed Muslim Brotherhood, and, most notably, Iran, have hampered the peace process for decades.
But the Chinese Internet has heard enough.
Upon the announcement of Yin’s death, social media was inundated with snippets and captioned screenshots from that section of the interview. His factual errors about the fatalities and comments on "blood drinkers" were starkly juxtaposed with harrowing images of Palestinian casualties, already pervasive on Chinese networks.
The hashtag #YinGangPassedAway quickly became a focal point for Palestine supporters, but also for anti-Americans, anti-liberals, and antisemites. Tellingly, the most popular comment on top of the page branded Yin as a "Spokesman for the Judeo-Nazis" 犹纳发言人.
Other prominent posts under the hashtag asserted that his sympathy for Israel exposed his "inhumane nature" 没有人性的, accusing him of being on the Israeli or Jewish payroll. Many popular posts read, “Yin doesn't view the Middle East with cold eyes 冷眼 but in cold blood 冷血."
On the other end of the hashtag, a minority of pundits condemned Chinese netizens for their vilification of Yin. Among them were critics of the glorification of jihadist and Palestinian terrorism on Chinese social media following the October 7 massacre, in which Hamas butchered several Chinese workers among the 1200 murdered Israelis and foreign nationals.
This group includes notoriously Islamophobic Chinese government employees and advisors, such as Marxist CASS scholar Xi Wuyi and Ministry of Commerce advisor Mei Xinyu. They leveraged Yin’s work on Xinjiang, counter-terrorism, and Muslim minorities to advance their hard-line beliefs on Islam in China and general hostility towards religion.
It is disheartening to witness someone's entire life's worth of learning reduced to a single, agenda-driven internet post. This sad reality, of course, is not limited to China - It's a hallmark of our attention economy.
"In the age of new media and 'taking things out of context,' teacher Yin's candor and bravery would be easily misinterpreted and criticized, adding to his troubles," wrote Professor Wang Jin of the Institute of Middle East Studies at Northwestern University, in an open letter of farewell to Yin.
Even in the West, expressing controversial and racist views takes some courage; a single tweet from a decade ago can spark public outrage or even result in "cancellation." In the worst-case scenario, someone might lose their dream job.
However, a third group of commentators on Yin’s death revealed that in China, those who wish to challenge the party line may face an even more perilous outcome.
Guiding Public Opinion
The third group was noticeably smaller, and only by reading between the lines can one discern that their praise for Yin is a veiled critique of the CCP.
Approximately three weeks after the October massacre, a 17,000-character compilation of Yin's recorded conversations and articles on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict began circulating online, reportedly with his blessing.
Its title alone defied the party line: “The intractability of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is due to Hamas’ deliberate obstruction of peace” - Not only did Chinese leaders refrain from condemning Hamas’ massacre or supporting Israel’s right to defend itself and free the hostages still held in Gaza, but the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s legal advisor shockingly spent 30 minutes defending Hamas’ brutality at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
In July, Foreign Minister Wang Yi further legitimized Hamas by welcoming them to Beijing during Chinese-led “mediation” talks with 14 Palestinian factions. When Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh was killed in Tehran - likely by Israel - China's top diplomat condemned the act. Baidu's online encyclopedia even changed its page to monochrome, a gesture of mourning typically reserved for state leaders like Jiang Zemin.
Yin's prominent colleagues, aligned with the national zeitgeist, twisted the death of this terrorist leader - who had rejoiced in Palestinian gang rapes and burning of entire Israeli families alive - into what they called “an act of terrorism.” Billionaire Eric Li's Guancha columnist described him as a "pacifist."
Yin also defied the official narrative surrounding Iran and its proxies. “The recent escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the result of maneuvering by Iran,” he contends.
Yin added that since coming to power in 1979, the Islamic Republic has sought to export its religious revolution and build up Shia forces across the predominantly Sunni Arab world and a “ring of fire” around the Jewish State's neck. As Israel pursued peace with the Arab world and the Palestinians, Tehran and Hamas aimed to “thwart the wave of reconciliation in the Middle East.”
His phrasing was deliberate. Since China brokered a détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023, Beijing has been touting a Chinese-led “wave of reconciliation” in the Middle East.
Party-state media and “politically correct” academics have credited Beijing with ushering in a “new Middle East.” In this new order, Xi Jinping's Global Security Initiative (GSI) eclipses the US-led security architecture with its bloc confrontation aimed at toppling Iran and propping up the West's “waning hegemony.”
After October 7th, China’s “wave of reconciliation” morphed into an “Al-Aqsa Flood” of Iran-backed terror across the region. Despite its constant condemnation of Israel, China has been conspicuously silent on Iran's attacks against Israel, as well as its arming and funding of Hamas and other regional proxies.
Instead, party officials have echoed Tehran’s denials of involvement in the Hamas assault. Even after Iran launched close to 350 missiles and drones at Israel in April, violating the sovereignty of multiple countries in the process, Chinese officials responded with "appreciation" rather than condemnation.
Wang Yi denounced Israel's reported killing of Hamas leader in Tehran as “a violation of the UN Charter” telling Iran's acting foreign minister that "China supports Iran in defending its sovereignty, security, and national dignity,” which could only be interpreted as a Chinese nod toward retaliation.
Chinese officials and academics have downplayed the Iran-backed assaults on Israel on seven fronts, framing them as a mere “spillover from Gaza.” They argue that the establishment of a Palestinian state “is the basic solution to solve all the problems in the Middle East.”
In contrast, Yin argued the “core issue” in the Middle East is not Israel or the absence of a Palestinian state, but the rise of Islamism, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and especially Iran.
In one of his last interviews for World Knowledge magazine, he likened Iran to an “octopus” with its arms manipulating various factions against Israel. He saw the theocratic regime in Tehran as a primary source of instability in the region.
While Yin specifically called out Hezbollah for "stirring the pot," China has remained silent over its attacks on Israel since October 8th, which have resulted in the displacement of over 60,000 Israelis from northern border towns, and may now lead to a third war between Israel and Lebanon.
Similarly, China has avoided addressing the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen for launching ballistic missiles and drones at Israeli cities over 2000 km away, including the Iran-made “hypersonic” missile that hit Modi'in this Sunday. It wasn't until their attacks on Red Sea shipping lanes began crippling international trade that China offered minimal lip service to maritime security, all while condemning the US-led coalition for “violating Yemeni sovereignty.”
To truly appreciate Yin’s environment, one needs to return to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Initially caught off guard, Chinese propagandists and officials struggled to formulate a coherent response in the first few weeks, creating a temporary vacuum in public discourse. During that time, various voices within China, including intellectuals, academics, and online commentators, harshly criticized China’s “no-limit partner” and Xi’s “best friend” for violating the UN Charter and for committing crimes against humanity.
China has learned from this mistake, refining its approach to “guiding public opinion” on Gaza. They must have learned from Russian propagandists about the value of the "primacy effect," where first impressions are particularly enduring. People tend to accept initial information and resist later conflicting messages, allowing early narratives to shape lasting perceptions even when contradictory facts arise.
The war began with Hamas’ massacre of over a thousand civilians and the taking of 251 hostages, followed by coordinated attacks from Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other Iran-backed militias.
Nevertheless, Chinese media and officials have immediately and overwhelmingly focused on Israel's military response to cast it as the primary aggressor, while portraying Palestinians, Iran, and its proxies as its victims. (For a detailed breakdown of the war's coverage on China Central TV's flagship news program, Xinwen Lianbo, in its first weeks, see
’s ).After the party “set the tone for all as the ultimate authority” 一锤定音定于一尊的权威, a tsunami of articles and posts glorifying Hamas’s actions followed. The rapid demonization of Israel in Chinese party-state media and official statements, filled with Hamas disinformation and antisemitic undertones, has quickly spread into Chinese academia and social media.
Many netizens and respected academics likened the Jihadi terrorist group to early communist guerrillas fighting the nationalists and comparing the “genocidal” Israelis to modern-day Nazis worse than Hitler.
Granted, Beijing's rhetorical stance provides little tangible support to the Palestinians, yet it allows it to make geopolitical gains with minimal risk.
To begin, Beijing uses the war to portray the US as hypocritical. Many Chinese elites view Israel as "a forward base for American hegemony," a tool through which the U.S. divides and controls the Middle East. Thus, the more wicked Israel is portrayed, the longer the shadow it casts on its “patron”.
How can Washington accuse China of supporting Russia in Ukraine and of committing genocide against Muslim minorities in Xinjiang, while at the same time arming and endorsing a “genocidal”, “colonialist” Israel in the UN Security Council? As such, it is argued that Washington only respects human rights and the "rules-based international order" when it serves to contain China.
Furthermore, by fully endorsing the Palestinians - recognized by Xi Jinping as “the core issue” of the Middle East - China positions itself as a champion of the Muslim world, the Global South, and the “progressive forces” splitting Western and liberal alliances from within.
In December, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) discovered that "Spamouflage," a multi-year network affiliated with the CCP's information operation arm, weaponized the Gaza conflict to spread anti-US sentiment on social media.
More than just tarnishing the West’s image, China expects reciprocal support for its own "core interests" in return. They include an ever-expanding list of issues, such as the illegal territories it claims in the South China Sea, China’s human rights violations in Tibet and Xinjiang, and, most crucially, Taiwan. China will need the political and economic support of the Global South if and when Xi decides to make a move on the democratic island.
By highlighting Washington's steadfast support for Israel and their ongoing challenges in neutralizing groups like Hamas or the Houthis, Beijing portrays American security guarantees as unreliable. This narrative is specifically aimed at countries like Taiwan and the Philippines, suggesting that their reliance on US protection against China could leave them abandoned or vulnerable.
To understand just how toxic anything Israeli or Jewish has become in China, consider these examples that colleagues and I have heard directly from those affected:
Prominent researchers had their Weibo and WeChat accounts suspended for voicing support for Israel;
meanwhile, their peers and official party-state media continue to spread anti-Israeli disinformation, antisemitic ("anti-Zionist") conspiracy theories, and revisionist history challenging the Jewish right to self-determination in their ancestral land;
Chinese academics who have expressed support for Israel or discussed the harrowing accounts of October 7 have faced harassment by peers online and direct attacks from their students (“We are antisemitic, we support Hamas”, they told them);
an annual conference on Chinese Jewish studies was postponed;
a party official called an Israeli colleague of mine in October to express sympathy because sending a written message would have been “too sensitive” 敏感;
state publishers canceled publications of several books on Jewish history;
similarly, publishing peer-reviewed articles that portray Israel or Jews in a positive light in key journals has become nearly impossible, with some papers rejected for alleged "pro-Israel bias." Since publishing in these key journals is essential for academic promotions, this restriction can hamper a scholar's career;
The Sino-Israel Global Network and Academic Leadership (SIGNAL), a longstanding Israeli non-profit specializing in track II diplomacy and offering academic resources and training programs on Israeli studies for Chinese faculty, was advised by the Chinese authorities to "keep a low profile";
most academics and mid-level government officials are forbidden from visiting Israel, and can only travel through third countries on their dime;
a Chinese party-state propagandist, fluent in Hebrew and a local celebrity in Israel, was prohibited from discussing the war after posting several videos on his social media accounts condemning terrorism, calling for the release of hostages, and voicing support for Israel;
out of over two dozen meetings with numerous Chinese scholars during our May visit to China, only one was willing to do something as basic as openly acknowledging our grief and denouncing Hamas terrorism (a few said it in private). "This is our responsibility as academics," he stated;
a year into the war, Chinese colleagues tell me their students do not know how it started or basic details about the atrocities committed by Hamas;
others tell me that speaking up for Israel is too much trouble because the attackers just keep on coming;
after the stabbing of Japanese tourists and American teachers in June, two Chinese scholars confided that the levels of animosity and incitement have become so extreme that an antisemitic attack against the small Jewish community in China seems only a matter of time.
I have further examples, but I cannot share details due to the potential of reprisal against the people involved. Only after his untimely death can I disclose, based on sources I cannot independently verify, that Yin Gang had been subjected to severe cyberbullying, and his views had been reported to state security.
Demonization in Five Pictures
The Ever-changing Dictionary
Yin’s story is not unique to the field of MENA studies; it reflects the broader constraints on academic freedom and free expression in Xi Jinping’s China. Charter 08 is but a distant memory, yet the suffocating smog of ideology is filling the air with “imminent fear.”
"In the past decade, the voice of public intellectuals in China has noticeably diminished and even been discredited," said He Weifeng, a retired legal professor from Peking University, in a recent interview with SCMP.
A July article on the silencing of public intellectuals in China,
莽莽, a newsletter by overseas Chinese dissidents, highlights the case of another professor at a leading Chinese university who was reported by his students three times, for allegedly "not loving Chairman Mao," for criticizing Sino-Russian relations, and for "glorifying" the West. Consequently, he lost funding for a state-funded key project, severely affecting his salary, and putting his career in jeopardy.In a series of interviews with Mainland and Hong Kong professors, Dr. Jue Jiang, now a postdoctoral researcher at SOAS, University of London, reveals disturbing accounts of "student informants" planted in classrooms to monitor their teachers:
“Xi Jinping revised the Constitution and I commented on it privately, but it was reported by my students. The school wanted to fire me. My mother committed suicide. Finally, the school still had some sympathies with me, so I was demoted, from professor directly to lecturer. Nowadays, there are students who blatantly record me in class and take pictures of me.”
The current climate of intimidation, academic and online censorship, self-censorship, state-driven “guidance of public opinion,” and nationalist mobs staging virtual lynching on social media has been likened to a digital revival of the Cultural Revolution.
The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), initiated by Mao Zedong, saw schools shut down and students mobilized into the Red Guards, fueling a violent cult of personality that plunged Chinese society into chaos, mutual mistrust, and terror.
Intellectuals and artists were persecuted and families were torn apart as children turned on parents and students on teachers. Mao's acolytes and rivaling cliques carried out brutal purges, killing an estimated 1.5 to 2 million people.
The open scars of the Cultural Revolution persist in what Professor Perry Link describes as "cyber versions” of struggle sessions, where "class enemies" were publicly humiliated by those closest to them, sometimes with fatal consequences.
“During the Cultural Revolution,” writes Link, “people were required to attend ‘study sessions’ in which they took turns at biaotai (表态 display of a viewpoint). Viewpoints were presented as one’s own but scrutinized by others for hints of divergence from ‘correctness.’ Finding flaws in someone else’s presentation could earn one credit.”
This hellish decade is vividly depicted in the opening scene of Netflix's adaptation of Liu Cixin's Three-Body Problem. The scene shows two Red Guards dragging physics professor Ye Zhetai onto the podium, with a dunce cap on his head and a placard hanging from his neck, both bearing his name and the crime: "reactionary” 反动分子.
As the audience yells "Revolution is righteous!" it is revealed that Ye is being prosecuted for teaching Einstein's theory of relativity. Shao Lin, his wife, is summoned onstage to denounce him for supporting the "counterrevolutionary" Big Bang theory, which "leaves room for the existence of God." Unfazed, Ye responds, "Science has given no evidence either way."
“Professor Ye makes a decision to speak the truth in a moment when speaking the truth would almost certainly lead to his death,” explained series creator David Benioff. “But he doesn’t recant when most people in his position would. He stands up for what he believes in, which is brave, but ultimately fatal.”
Yin Gang was just a teenager when the Cultural Revolution began in May 1966, but he would later witness its reality firsthand. His father-in-law, Liu Gong, was appointed in the early 1980s as editor-in-chief of China Reconstructs 中国建设, a leading monthly magazine targeting foreign audiences and overseen by the CCP Propaganda Department.
Dissident author Cao Changqing notes that despite his Red upbringing, Liu Gong became disillusioned with the Party after enduring brutal beatings and persecution during the Cultural Revolution, which left him with severe brain trauma. In 1983, while leading a Propaganda Department delegation to the US, Liu defected and later applied for political asylum.
Liu was swiftly labeled an "American spy" and expelled from the Party, leaving his family in Beijing to suffer the consequences of guilt by association. His daughter, Liu Xiaodong (pseudonym Third Sister 三妹), lost a lucrative teaching position at Renmin University.
Xiaodong’s younger sister’s husband and Liu's son-in-law was Yin Gang. When his father-in-law defected, Yin had worked for one of the largest state-owned publishing houses as a dictionary compiler.
Yin had just passed a national-level English exam, a remarkable achievement he earned by teaching himself, which would have qualified him for a diploma equivalent to a university degree.
However, to receive his certificate, the publishing house’s Party Committee demanded Yin renounce his father-in-law. When Yin refused, they labeled him "reactionary" 反动分子 and “singled him out for criticism in conferences and meetings,” per Cao's account. Forced to leave the company, he turned to Middle Eastern studies.
Yin's unwavering commitment to independent research, unrestricted by the political and ideological shackles of the CCP, was evident even then. In a 1983 article, On the Sinicization of Dictionaries, he noted that biographical entries for individuals, organizations, and historical events often changed through the decades with each new edition.
Often, these versions contradicted one another and even reversed previous definitions. Rather than offering a factual account and allowing readers to form their own conclusions, the dictionaries imposed the party’s ideological “class analysis” on the entries. "It is baffling to me," Yin remarked, "that this erratic compilation style seems to be a defining feature of Chinese dictionaries."
Forty years later, his disdain for historical distortions under the duress of state ideology remained undiminished. In 2022 he wrote a book review titled “The Mission of the Historian Is to Set the Record Straight and Decipher Historical Truths.”
Yin was no dissident, but a devoted Chinese patriot. He inherited two millennia of historiography, from Sima Qian’s account of the "burning of books and burying of scholars" to the May Fourth intellectuals who laid the foundation for China's pursuit of self-determination in the early 20th century.
The marginalization and persecution of free-spirited people like him, however, risks turning the country they love into an echo chamber - one incapable of self-correction. Without their voices, China would struggle to address policy missteps, impeding its progress and potentially stalling its rise on the world stage.
This idea is poignantly reflected by Peking University economist and a relative of Yin, Wang Dingding, who left a 16-character eulogy in his wake:
"A lifetime of unwavering integrity 毕生耿直, a compass for the academic world 学界之罡. Rare are those who dare to speak out 难得敢言, yet he never forgot to heed the lessons of history 不忘鉴殷."
The sentence carries a clever play on the professor’s name: Gang 罡 refers to the bright stars of the Big Dipper, which help navigators locate the North Star. Yin 殷 is associated with the late Shang dynasty (1600-1050 BCE) and alludes to the chengyu (idiom) "the lessons of Yin are closer than they appear" 殷鉴不远.
Drawn from the Book of Songs in the Zhou dynasty (1046-256 BCE), the chengyu served as a warning: just as the Shang overthrew the Xia dynasty, they too should have heeded the cautionary tale of tyranny and moral decay that led to their downfall at the hands of Zhou.
Death
I'll end with one last historical analogy. One blogger linked the criticism directed at Yin Gang to Zhang Zhixin, calling it a "tragic history" that "must not be repeated."
Zhang Zhixin, born in 1930 in Tianjin, was a fervent Communist and dedicated cadre in Liaoning's Propaganda Department. As the Cultural Revolution raged, she dared criticize Mao's disastrous Great Leap Forward (1959-1961), which led to tens of millions of deaths from starvation.
Zhang moreover defended those the “Great Helmsman” had purged, and openly chastised Mao's wife and notorious leader of the Gang of Four, Jiang Qing, and Mao's right-hand man, General Lin Biao, for pushing the Party to the extreme left.
For her defiance, she was labeled a "counterrevolutionary" and imprisoned. Zhang was subsequently subjected to unspeakable torture and rape by the authorities, yet she refused to yield. On April 4, 1975, her spirit unbroken, she was silenced before being paraded and executed, with her larynx slit to prevent her final cry of defiance.
After Mao died, she was posthumously rehabilitated by the CCP and branded a “martyr”. The sharp turn came after party reformers had repurposed her story to condemn the Gang of Four's "leftist deviation.” Her criticisms of Mao had been neatly airbrushed.
In those early years of Reform and Opening, sculptor Tang Daxi unveiled Brave Warrior 猛士 in her honor. It depicted Zhang as a bare-chested female warrior on a galloping horse, defiantly drawing a bow reminiscent of the hammer and sickle.
This bold portrayal earned the Guangdong Provincial Art Exhibition Excellence Award but sparked controversy for being "vulgar," "unfit for the country’s circumstances" 不合国情, and "corrupting social norms" 有伤风化.
The government attempted to halt Warrior's future exhibitions. Some even called for an investigation into the artist. Luckily, the First Secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee, Ren Zhongyi, stepped in - This was the same man with the dunce cap in the photograph of the violent struggle session posted above.
Since 1987, Brave Warrior has stood in Guangzhou People's Park, bearing the inscription: "Devoted to those who struggle for the truth" 献给为真理而斗争的人.
***
May Yin Gang's memory be a blessing.
Discourse Power is written by Tuvia Gering, a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Any views expressed in this newsletter, as well as any errors, are solely those of the author. Follow on X @GeringTuvia