"If You Don’t Confront These Groups in Syria, You’ll Face Them at Home"
Discourse Power | December 20, 2024
Greetings from Jerusalem,
I apologize for not cluttering your inbox over the last two months as I was traveling.
Today features Chinese responses to the overthrow of Assad. We start with a fully translated interview with Professor Sun Degang published yesterday discussing how the fall of Syria impacts all national and subnational actors, from China and the US to Israel and Iran. Prof. Han Jianwei, anticipates this will have a “profound” impact on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while Yang Xiaotong and others give a gloomy assessment, examining terrorists and separatists originating in Xinjiang who have been fighting in Syria and now pointing their guns back at the mainland. We conclude with the CCP Propaganda Department's China Daily editorial, which blames its usual suspect for all of the world's ills.
A few recommendations before we start:
Professor
argues for the Atlantic Council that China is not a significant actor in Syria, with limited engagement and weak bilateral ties with the Assad regime. While Beijing's past support for Assad may spark resentment among Syria’s new leaders and population, it is unlikely to disrupt China’s Middle East strategy. Also, check out the recent posts by for his and the good folk at .Sophia Yan of The Telegraph has the best report I've seen this week on China and the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP). The report includes videos and quotes from ethnically Uyghur TIP members vowing to take the fight to the kufrs in China, which, following a series of terror attacks in the mainland, has subjected more than one million Uyghurs to re-education, and forced labor camps, thousands imprisoned for “crimes” like praying, fasting, or growing long beards.
INSS colleague Ofir Dayan and I discuss the difficulties Dr. Xiao Junzheng, China's new ambassador to Israel, faces. What's at stake includes restoring confidence after October 7 and striking a balance between Beijing's pro-Palestinian hostility and access to Israeli tech and market. Click through the Atlantic Council's New Atlanticist here.
I also wrote the intro to James Farquharson's translation of Prof. Wang Wen, Dean of Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China (RDCY), as featured in
. Wang's article calls on China to "tear down this wall," the Great Firewall, that is (but not really). Read it here.
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Tuvia
"The ‘Axis of Resistance’ has been losing on three fronts...Israel will maintain its momentum, targeting Iraqi Shiite militias and even expanding operations against Iran itself"
Prof. Sun Degang, Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Fudan University, argues that the upheaval in Syria marks a critical turning point, severely weakening the Iran-led "Axis of Resistance." He predicts limited regional spillover risks but highlights significant geopolitical opportunities for Israel and the U.S. to escalate pressure on Iran and Lebanon while positioning China as a key player in post-war reconstruction and shaping regional stability.
Full translation of Sun’s interview with Guancha, published on December 19, 2024:
The Observer: Syria's domestic economy was on the verge of collapse before the Assad government fell. Similar economic pressures are common in neighboring countries. How do you assess the likelihood of the Syrian crisis spilling over into these countries? How will it affect countries such as Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt?
Sun Degang: I believe this Syrian crisis will have minimal impact on Egypt and Jordan. The Syrian crisis is political, not an economic one, and the fall of the Assad government reflects four sets of contradictions:
The contradiction between the Assad government and the opposition;
The contradiction between Iran and Israel;
The contradiction between Russia and Turkey;
The contradiction between the U.S. and Russia.
Previously, changes in Syria's domestic situation were closely related to the Iran-Israel conflict. From a chronological standpoint, the Syrian crisis erupted abruptly after the Lebanon-Israel ceasefire. Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Bashar al-Assad government in Syria are both important members of the [Iran-led] "Axis of Resistance" against Israel.
Following these changes in the Syrian situation, the focus of the Iran-Israel contest 博弈 may shift back to Lebanon, raising concerns about whether the Lebanon-Israel ceasefire can be maintained. Lebanon may be drawn back into a new crisis if the Syrian crisis worsens. In comparison, the changes in Syria have a much smaller impact on Jordan and Egypt, and the spillover risks are not as severe as one would think.
The Observer: Russia has announced that it has suspended its wheat supply to Syria due to the new Syrian government's uncertainty and payment delays. How will this affect the new Syrian regime, centered on Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)? Does this imply that the latest Syrian government must seize grain-producing regions and oil fields from the Kurds to maintain its regime's fiscal viability?
Sun Degang: Russia is in a completely passive position in this round of changes in Syria, having already withdrawn some of its military forces. HTS also intends to force Russia to withdraw its troops and close its military bases in Syria. In retaliation, Russia halted wheat exports to Syria. The resulting wheat shortage may exacerbate tensions between Syria's various factions.
HTS now controls the majority of Syrian cities, but stabilizing the country presents significant challenges. This is because the primary grain-producing regions remain under Kurdish control, as do the main oil fields, particularly the al-Omar oil field in the Deir ez-Zor Governorate. If HTS wants to maintain its rule, it will seek to gain control of grain and oil resources.
I believe that in the future, HTS may use the pretext of disarming local forces to demand that the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) hand over their weapons, thereby achieving national unity. However, the SDF will not just wait for the axe to fall 坐以待毙; they will rely on US assistance to defend the eastern regions. At that point, tensions between HTS and the SDF could flare up, putting the US and Turkey's diplomatic mediation skills to the test. If mediation efforts fail, an internal conflict between the two factions may arise.
HTS opposes not only the Assad government but also Kurdish autonomy and independence. However, for HTS, the current priority is to stabilize major cities throughout the country. Even if they intend to challenge Kurdish forces, they will require Turkey's assistance and support, which will necessitate communication between Turkey and the US. Therefore, I believe HTS will not actively engage in large-scale conflict.
The Observer: Can [HTS leader] Abu Mohammed al-Jolani stabilize the Syrian situation? Is there a possibility of the conflict turning into a civil war? If so, could a "ISIS 2.0" make a comeback?
Sun Degang: Jolani's current priority is to stabilize the capital while gaining international recognition, particularly from Arab neighbors and Western nations. This indicates that Jolani's primary goal is not to incite civil war. As a result, while the possibility of a Syrian civil war exists, it is not significant. The current Syrian crisis remains a local issue, with no prospect of a full-fledged war.
At the same time, the likelihood of an ISIS resurgence is extremely low. From last year to this year, the US conducted numerous airstrikes against what's left of ISIS in Syria, targeting them as soon as they pop their head 几乎是露头就打. Whether under the Biden administration or the incoming Trump administration, the United States' primary goal in Syria remains to prevent the resurgence of both Al-Qaeda and ISIS. That's why there's little chance that ISIS will succeed in taking advantage of the situation.
The Observer: In recent years, Iran's "Axis of Resistance" has played a significant role in Middle Eastern politics. How severe is the blow dealt to the "Axis" by the current developments in Syria, and how will this affect the geopolitical situation going forward?
Sun Degang: Since October 2023, Israel has been on the defensive and steadfastly passive, while the "Axis of Resistance" was on the offensive. However, since September of this year, the situation has shifted dramatically. Senior leaders of Lebanon's Hezbollah were assassinated in targeted strikes, Israel eliminated key Hamas forces, including its leaders, and the Bashar al-Assad regime collapsed, with Assad fleeing to Moscow.
This means that along the eastern Mediterranean coast, the "Axis of Resistance" has been losing on three fronts. As the Iran-led "Axis" saw a sharp drop in both its will and ability to fight back, Israel has moved from passively enduring attacks to launching extensive retaliation. Currently, only the Iraqi Shiite militias and the Houthis are relatively intact. The two teams' offensive and defensive strategic balance has shifted.
I believe Israel will maintain its momentum, targeting Iraqi Shiite militias and even expanding operations against Iran itself. Israel and the US are likely to wait for Trump's inauguration before launching a joint campaign against the "Axis of Resistance" that may include additional military strikes.
The Observer: Following Israel's incursion into Syria to control Mount Hermon and the establishment of radar and monitoring stations, a gap has appeared in Iran's regional radar defense network against Israel. Israeli plans to attack Iran's nuclear facilities are currently being discussed internally. How likely is this to occur?
Sun Degang: Hitting Iran's nuclear facilities has always been a set policy for Israel. Although external pressure from the Biden administration has kept Israel from acting against Iranian nuclear facilities, the risk is growing. Following Donald Trump's inauguration on January 20, the US may provide unconditional support to Israel.
Iran will also consider the implications of its lack of nuclear capabilities in recent confrontations with Israel. Given Iran's major breaches of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), it may seek to acquire additional nuclear capabilities in the future. This suggests that after Trump takes office, Israel and the US may collaborate to sabotage Iran's nuclear facilities, or even launch direct strikes, to end Iran's growing nuclear threat to Israel for good.
In terms of capability, I believe that with US assistance, such as GBU-28 bunker-busting bombs, Israel can destroy Iran's nuclear facilities. In addition, Israel can use US refueling aircraft or take off from US bases in Iraq to overcome range limitations.
The Observer: What are Israel's next steps in its Iraq strategy? Who are its potential partners?
Sun Degang: Iraq's geographical location is critical to Israel. Israel has long maintained cooperative relations with Iraq's Kurdish population. On January 15, this year, Iran announced that it had destroyed an Israeli Mossad intelligence station in the Iraqi Kurdish region with ballistic missiles. In addition, in retaliation for Iran's second wave of missile attacks, the Israeli Air Force launched air-launched ballistic missiles over Iraqi airspace to strike Iranian targets.
Following the changes in Syria, Israel is expected to reorganize its presence in Iraq, targeting Iraqi Shiite militias and taking action against Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) bases in Iraq. In doing so, Iraq may become a frontline in Israel's efforts to undermine and strike Iran.
However, Iraqi factions, whether Sunni, Shiite, or Kurdish, are all concerned about Iran's rivalry with Israel. Consequently, US military bases in Iraq will continue to provide the most reliable support for Israel's operations in the region.
The Observer: In the past, the Iraqi government demanded the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq. In September of this year, the two sides agreed that the US would withdraw some of its long-term bases in Iraq. Will the US eventually implement this agreement despite the changing Syrian situation?
Sun Degang: The US intends to dismantle the entire "Axis of Resistance" and prevent Iran from resuming military operations that could restore the "Iraq-Syria-Lebanon-Palestine corridor." As long as the "Axis of Resistance" exists, the US will need to keep military bases in Iraq to maintain a foothold there, so, in the short term, the US will not withdraw its troops from Iraq.
The Observer: Trump will formally take office on January 20. Compared to the Biden administration, Trump's team is more conservative and has historically harbored stronger hostility toward groups such as HTS. How do you think the future Trump administration will deal with Turkey, HTS, and the Syrian National Army? During his first term, Trump attempted to withdraw troops from Syria but was stopped by the Pentagon. Will he revisit the withdrawal issue, particularly as it relates to US forces in Kurdish regions?
Sun Degang: Biden and Trump's policies differ significantly. As a businessman, Trump has long been skeptical of Syria's strategic importance. Currently, Trump's team appears to be in contact with HTS, most likely offering to remove HTS from the list of terrorist organizations in exchange for the group taking a pro-US stance. Both sides are attempting to avoid sending the incorrect signals. The US is engaging HTS directly, and HTS is not criticizing the US or strongly condemning Israel's cross-border attacks on Syria.
However, I do not believe the US will cut ties with the Syrian Kurds, particularly the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The US will most likely use a multifaceted strategy to prevent any single party from becoming too dominant. The Trump administration will seek to maintain communication with Turkey and Israel to stabilize the local situation and balance the power of Israel, Turkey, HTS, and other forces in the region, ensuring that no single faction gains monopolistic control.
In the short term, the US will not withdraw from Kurdish territories. HTS was once a Syrian branch of Al-Qaeda that later became the al-Nusra Front. The US remains deeply concerned about whether HTS will turn its weapons against it again or reconcile with Iran and Russia. For this reason, the US may strengthen its presence in Kurdish-controlled areas of Syria, ensuring the Kurds' survival while preventing Iran and Russia from regaining influence.
The Observer: What impact will the major Middle Eastern upheaval have on China? What lessons can we draw from this to help shape China's Middle East strategy in the future?
Sun Degang: I believe that the current changes in Syria have little impact on China. Syria is not a major investment target for China, nor is it a critical area for protecting Chinese citizens abroad. The upheaval in Syria is primarily the result of internal factors. Regardless of who takes power, economic and social reconstruction will inevitably rely on China. China's strong infrastructure capabilities can help Syria quickly restart production and restore the administration.
China's Syria policy should adhere to a few guiding principles:
First, Syria must be governed by Syrians; it should not become a sphere of influence for foreign powers or a proxy state.
Second, China supports Syria's territorial sovereignty and opposes any party attempting to impose hegemony or undermine Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Third, China should help Syria rebuild after the war, as stability in Syria is critical to the region's development as a Middle Eastern crossroads.
As long as post-war reconstruction begins in Syria, it will benefit both local populations and Syrian refugees around the world. Unlike Israel, Turkey, Russia, and Iran, China does not have a military presence in Syria. Against this backdrop, I believe China's Syria policy will stand the test of time: a promoter of stability through development and a consolidator of peace through growth.
Link: https://web.archive.org/web/20241220061848/https://m.guancha.cn/sundegang/2024_12_19_759402.shtml
"The crisis in Syria is just getting started"
“The fall of the Assad regime is a casualty of the spillover of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” writes Professor Han Jianwei with the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University (SISU). “This development is bound to have a profound impact on the future evolution of the Palestinian-Israeli situation.”
Excerpt from Han's article, published on December 11, 2024, on the China Internet Information Center (China.com.cn), managed by the CCP Propaganda Department:
“First, the change in Syria has dealt a heavy blow to the Iranian-led "Axis of Resistance," fundamentally altering the balance of power between the Israeli and Iranian camps and further tilting it in favor of Israel. The fall of the Assad regime has cut off Iran's lifeline of arms and assistance to Lebanon's Hezbollah, forcing the latter to fight Israel alone. However, it remains to be seen whether this will prompt Israel to completely dissolve the Lebanese-Israeli ceasefire and restart the war.
“The fall of the Assad regime has reduced Iran's support for the Palestinian cause to a pipe dream 空中楼阁, and the strategy of "exporting the revolution" has suffered a significant setback. This will not only erode the trust of other proxies in Iran but will also have serious consequences for Iran's national stability and development. Iran's confidence and ability to wage an effective proxy war against Israel will wane over time. At the same time, Israel is likely to step up its internal infiltration of Iran as well as external strikes.
“Furthermore, Hamas is increasingly isolated and unsupported, and Trump's rise to power will give Israel more leeway to fight it. There are two broad possibilities for Hamas' future fate: first, under US-Israeli pressure to sign a truce agreement, release hostages, and end the Gaza crisis; second, Hamas members flee and scatter around the world, the organization becomes more disorganized, and objectively gives up substantial resistance. Whatever the case, it places Israel in a completely dominant position on the Palestinian front. And, in light of the Trump administration's increased support for Israel, the international community's attempt to promote the "two-state solution" will become even more elusive and hard to implement.”
Link: https://web.archive.org/web/20241211084120/https://mideast.shisu.edu.cn/e7/d2/c3991a190418/page.htm
"Victorious rebel leader al-Golani has fought arm-in-arm with Turkestan Islamic Party militants who seek an Islamic state in Xinjiang"
Syria has the potential to pose obstacles to China's global ambitions, argues Mr. Yang Xiaotong of the Bejing-based Grandview Institution, signaling the need for Beijing to reassess its foreign policy toward Syria and beyond.
Excerpts from Yang’s article, published in English in the Asia Times on December 13, 2024:
China’s concern stems from credible reports of the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) fighting alongside HTS. The TIP, also known as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), is a Uyghur separatist group with origins in China’s restive western province of Xinjiang and deep ties to al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups.
It is seeking an independent Islamic state in Xinjiang called East Turkestan. TIP was designated a terrorist organization by China and the UN, and up until 2020, also by the US. The militant group was founded in Pakistan but has since established a foothold in neighboring Afghanistan. In recent years, the group’s influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan waned under Chinese pressure.
In a surprising turn of events, many of the militants and their families took refuge in the Syrian rebel stronghold of Idlib. By 2017, then-Syrian ambassador to China Imad Moustapha claimed that there were as many as 5,000 Uyghur militants in Syria.
The Emir of HTS, Abu Mohammed al-Golani, has said:
“The TIP has been in Syria for seven years and has never posed a threat to the outside world. They are committed to defending Idlib against the Assad regime’s aggression because as Uyghurs, they face persecution in China – which we strongly condemn – and have nowhere else to go. But their struggle against China is not ours. They are welcomed to stay as long they abide by our rules – which they do.”
Beyond voicing support for the Uyghur cause, HTS has no evident interest in taking on China. As such, HTS’ victory in the Syrian civil war does not pose an immediate threat to China.
However, TIP militants gaining combat experience does. Chinese Major General Jin Yinan has claimed that the TIP is fighting in Syria to draw attention to the Uyghur cause and to gain combat experience so that they can one day use those fighting skills against Beijing.
The claim was confirmed when the Emir of the TIP, Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, called on Uyghurs from around the world to join the fight against the Assad regime – and China. “Today, we are helping our brothers wage jihad in Greater Syria. Tomorrow, the soldiers of Islam must be ready to return to China to liberate Xinjiang from the communist occupiers.”
Beijing claims that the TIP carried out terrorist attacks in China in 2008, 2011, 2013, 2014 and 2015. Attacks included ramming vehicles into pedestrians, stabbings with knives in public areas, car bombs, and suicide bombings.
It is difficult to verify if the group was behind all of the claimed attacks.
in 2022, China’s Permanent Representative to the UN claimed that TIP-related violence was resurgent in recent years, saying, “the TIP is not only launching attacks in Syria, but is also using Syria as base to recruit and train militants to launch attacks on China and Central Asia.”
To tackle the reemergent threat, Beijing vowed to “coordinate with Syria and other relevant parties to combat TIP terrorism.”
Rumors of Chinese troop deployments to Syria surfaced in 2017 and 2018, but in the end, none were deployed. In addition, while Chinese-made weapons made their way to government forces, they were either redistributed by third parties or were sold to Syria a long time ago. No direct arms sales were made after the civil war broke out.
Despite TIP’s supposed rising threat to China’s national security, Beijing has remained steadfast to its decade-long modus operandi of non-intervention. It has been content so far to freeride on other countries with boots on the ground in Syria.
Beijing is worried that while China itself remains out of reach, TIP militants will once again settle in neighboring Afghanistan and Pakistan. That’s a high risk as the two countries have become safe havens in recent years for various terrorist organizations, including ISIS-K, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).
Indeed, there has been an uptick in attacks on Chinese citizens and assets abroad in recent years, especially in Pakistan. Despite the lack of available evidence, Beijing believes these attacks stem from the TIP’s collusion with ISIS, al-Qaeda and the BLA to undermine China’s overseas interests and investments.
Therefore, should battle-hardened TIP militants return to Pakistan and join forces with the TTP, BLA and others, as Beijing claims is already happening, it would pose a serious threat to China’s strategic interests as its flagship project – the Belt and Road Initiative – runs through the country.
With Assad ousted and Russia and Iran’s ability to check and contain Syrian rebel groups and their allies diminished, the likelihood of this scenario has increased exponentially.
Link: https://asiatimes.com/2024/12/china-has-cause-to-be-terrified-of-rebel-run-syria/
"If you don't confront these terrorist groups in Syria, you'll face them in Central Asia or closer to home"
So warns Dayiwan 大伊万 ("Big Ivan"), a blogger with 500K followers on Douyin, rejecting mainland netizens' assertions that what happens in Syria is inconsequential to China.
Excerpt from Big Ivan’s blog post, published December 10, 2024, and was the top trending post on Guancha for a short while:
"If the deeply entrenched 打了窝 terrorist groups [in Syria] are not completely eradicated, there will always be traitors 反贼 [in China] fixated on the existence of this far-away sanctuary.
"Unless this hornet's nest is decisively dealt with, we'll face immediate and ongoing repercussions. It’s reminiscent of the Roman Empire, perpetually battling relentless waves of barbarians crossing the Rhine and Danube, much like enemies endlessly respawning in a video game.
"Given the growing intensity of the US-China rivalry, it’s highly likely that the US will suddenly 'remember' the existence of such groups, further complicating our challenges.
"A US-backed terrorist group represents a thousand days of relentless upheaval. But can we realistically maintain a thousand days of defense 总有千日做贼，哪有千日防贼的呢?
"Sustaining such vigilance indefinitely is impossible. Mobilizing vast resources to counter them would only drain us completely. Instead, why not adopt an alternative approach: directly neutralize these groups in Syria in one decisive action?
"Don't dismiss Syria as irrelevant just because it's 10,000 miles away. To remain a land power in Eurasia and ensure internal stability, we must fully defeat these groups until they collapse. Syria is inevitably linked to us!"
Link: https://web.archive.org/web/20241210124410/https://user.guancha.cn/main/content?id=1345291&s=zwyess
CCP Propaganda Department's China Daily editorial found the real culprit behind Assad's fall: Israel
So what about Iran and Turkey? According to China Daily, they are among the countries that have condemned Israel for violating Syrian sovereignty. Sovereignty, as Beijing reminds us, is sacred, unless the narrative needs a little bending (or you're sitting in Ukraine, the Philippines, etc)
According to the article published today, Israel is "looting a neighbor's house when it is on fire", and "Claiming that to safeguard its security, Israel has to set up a buffer zone inside its neighbor's territory is gangster logic", "Israel's reckless attacks in Syria must be condemned and brought to an end."
It adds, "Israel's aggression has already played a significant, if not decisive, role in triggering what is now happening in Syria, and elsewhere in the region. Its attacks on Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran, since the onset of its conflict with Hamas more than a year ago have dramatically changed the power balance in the Middle East and even broken the region's strategic equilibrium."
"Israel's incursion also points to the challenge for both Syria and the world community to maintain the territorial integrity of Syria."
Discourse Power is written by Tuvia Gering, a CTI analyst at Planet Nine in Tel Aviv and a non-resident fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) Israel-China Policy Center and the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Any views expressed in this newsletter, as well as any errors, are solely those of the author. Follow on BlueSky and X @GeringTuvia