From Tel Aviv to Brussels: Who is China's New Ambassador to the EU?
From Tel Aviv to Brussels: Who is China's New Ambassador to the EU?
Discourse Power | July 23, 2024
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From Tel Aviv to Brussels: Who is China's New Ambassador to the EU?
China’s new ambassador in Brussels will be defined not by diplomatic charm but by a relentless pursuit of party-state interests
by Tuvia Gering
China's ambassador to Israel, Cai Run, will be relocating from Tel Aviv to Brussels in September to assume the role of PRC envoy to the European Union, as first reported by Finbarr Bermingham.
Amid strained Israel-China relations, Cai’s promotion has sparked a flurry of speculation. In this article, we look at the likely reasons for the promotion, what the EU should expect from Fu Cong's successor, and the lessons learned from his tenure about China's foreign policy.
As always, any views expressed in this newsletter, as well as any errors, are strictly my own.
Why Cai
Ambassador Cai, 57, is a career diplomat in the party-state corps, though he may be better described as a “career policy planner.” The Shandong native rose through the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) International Liaison Department (ILD) in the 1990s, working first at the Bureau for North American, Oceanic, and North European Affairs and then at its Research Office.
After a brief stint at the turn of the century as Deputy Mayor of Binzhou, a city of 300,000 people in Shaanxi Province, Cai spent six years at the CCP Central Foreign Affairs Commission. His first job as a diplomatic officer was at China's embassy in Washington D.C., where he worked as a counselor and minister counselor until 2008. He then returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to lead policy research for the next eight years.
His appointment as ambassador to Portugal from 2015-2020 can be attributed to his experience in strategic planning and familiarity with the trans-Atlantic relationship. At that time, Lisbon was still recovering from its 2011 bankruptcy. Beijing, with its high-rolling Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), stepped in as a top investor in strategic sectors, including energy, transportation, health, insurance, construction, media, and financial services.
Because of its "special relationship" with Washington, China considers Israel, like the EU, to be a part of "the West." Akin to Portugal, Israel’s geography positions it as a local hub and a "gateway to Europe." Within Cai's first year in Tel Aviv since early 2021, the Haifa Bay Port began operations under the state-owned Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG), and the new container terminal at Ashdod's South Port, built by the state-owned Pan Mediterranean Engineering (PMEC), also became operational.
Another point of comparison between Israel and the Portuguese Republic is Chinese investment. Between 2013 and 2020, Israel has become one of China's top destinations for outward investments, attracting at least $11-14 billion, 95% of which come from the high-tech sector.
When the Trump administration fired the first salvos of the trade and tech wars and pressured American allies to "decouple" from the Chinese economy, Cai's role in Portugal and later in Israel during the Biden administration was to ensure Beijing’s continued access to Western technologies and strategic economic sectors.
A second Trump administration is on the horizon as China shifts its economic model from rapid growth to "new quality productive forces." Cai's background will be critical in securing access to European trade and innovation in the face of rising great power competition and ongoing wars in Europe and the Middle East.
From Bomb Shelters to Boardrooms
Cai Run was appointed ambassador to Israel in the most challenging period, arriving and departing during a time of pandemics and wars.
He presented his credentials to the Israeli president in April 2021, at the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic and almost a year after his predecessor, Du Wei, passed away tragically from a heart attack. A month later, Hamas fired over 200 rockets from Gaza, sparking the 2021 Gaza war and forcing the new Ambassador and his staff to flee to the bomb shelters along with two million Israelis.
Ambassador Cai got off on the wrong foot. Despite Hamas's terror attacks against civilians and the surge of antisemitism in Chinese media during these twelve days of conflict, Ambassador Cai kept notably silent, showing little empathy or concern for his host country. Meanwhile, his counterpart in Ramallah, Guo Wei, vocally supported the Palestinians (as he should have), while other foreign diplomats in Tel Aviv showed their solidarity with Israel and condemned the terror attacks.
After the dust settled, he got to work. With China still closed to the outside world due to draconian COVID-19 restrictions, he ensured the return of direct flights and assisted Israeli health workers in importing personal protective equipment.
During the two wars that bookended his ambassadorship, Cai played an important role in maintaining open lines of communication between Jerusalem and Beijing. He can make the argument that the Netanyahu government still views China as a significant economic partner, not a rival, and has refrained from publicly denouncing its open hostility.
Another noteworthy accomplishment is that more than 20,000 Chinese laborers have stayed in Israel after October 7 and are still working on infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, and subways, in contrast to many other foreign workers who fled to their home countries. This can be attributed to his efforts with the government, which included building a positive working relationship with the Minister of Housing and Construction.
Trade between China and Israel increased significantly during his three years in Tel Aviv, reaching a record of $21 billion in 2022 (though the trade deficit also set records at $8.6 billion). Bilateral trade fell sharply by 17% in 2023, to $17.5 billion, but this was probably a course correction following the pandemic shopping frenzy.
The staggering number of Chinese-made automobiles sold in Israel is undoubtedly a source of pride in the embassy; by 2023, 14,000 vehicles, or one out of two electric vehicles (EVs) sold in Israel, were Chinese brands. By the first half of 2024, Chinese brands dominated all car sales in Israel, with 34,600 sold, which includes 68% of all EVs sold.
Ambassador Cai prioritized building relationships with Israel's elite over engaging the laobaixing (public). He frequently hosted dinners for select academics and newspaper editors at his home, briefed journalists before their fully paid trips to China, and invited political figures and friendship groups to the embassy's favorite Chinese restaurant in Tel Aviv.
As was customary for foreign missions, he hosted large holiday celebrations for hundreds of “old friends” in rented venues. Along with my INSS colleagues, I was invited to some of these events, and His Excellency welcomed us with cordiality despite our differences. Occasionally, the ambassador and his team met with us at the institute, helped coordinate our work visits to China, and sent us wine bottles for the holidays.
One of Ambassador Cai's most memorable moments occurred this time last year when he was seen with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the latter's office, holding Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s tome, The Governance of China. This series of books has become a staple on the desks of world leaders and business tycoons seeking to display their deference to the "philosopher king." Pundits conjectured that Netanyahu was sending a defiant message to US President Joe Biden. The White House had declined to invite the Israeli prime minister to Washington because of Netanyahu’s legal reforms, which many in Israel and abroad see as undemocratic.
The meeting was more likely a prelude to Netanyahu's scheduled visit to Beijing, which had to be canceled because of the ongoing war. Another possible explanation, which has not been reported until now, is that Netanyahu had previously sent General Secretary Xi Jinping a signed copy of his new autobiographical book, to which Xi returned in kind with his magnum opus.
Whatever the reason, Ambassador Cai took the opportunity to remind Netanyahu that "China hopes that Israel will continue to take the right positions regarding Taiwan, Xinjiang, human rights, and other issues that touch on China's core interests."
The Victim And The Pillar
A questionable record that Ambassador Cai undoubtedly set was being invited to démarche more than any other PRC ambassador before him. The Israeli Foreign Ministry likely challenged him regarding Beijing's anti-Israel policies and remarks that shadowed both the current war and the conflict in 2021.
Furthermore, Ambassador Cai is leaving office with nearly zero Chinese tourists or exchange students in Israel, down from a peak of 170,000 and 1400 in 2019, respectively, as a result of his government's refusal to alter the travel advisory issued by his embassy. A decade ago, China was a top investor in Israel; today, it barely ranks among the top ten.
People-to-people relations have likewise deteriorated significantly. According to the 2024 annual Pew poll published this month, 62% of Israelis now have a negative opinion of China, the lowest score since 2013, with favorability dropping 15 points from the 2023 poll to 33%.
While some of these statistics can be attributed to the COVID-19 restrictions, great power competition, and the ongoing war, others demonstrate a lack of initiative on the embassy’s behalf.
To illustrate, the embassy invested tens of millions of dollars in the establishment of a Chinese Culture Center in 2017, which ceased operation after the October massacre. The Petah Tikvah branch of UIBE, a prestigious business administration university based in Beijing, has received no support from the embassy since its opening in 2021 and is now facing closure because Chinese students and staff are not allowed to return.
Such a track record inevitably draws attention to Cai’s promotion.
One possible explanation is that the Chinese Ambassador fell victim to unfortunate circumstances. Without the Hamas invasion and massacre on October 7, the Middle East would not have been burning as it is today. In that scenario, Netanyahu's planned visit to China for the China-Israel Joint Committee on Innovation Cooperation would have taken place, accompanied by a battalion of business leaders, and resulted in major agreements.
A free trade agreement (FTA), which has been in the works since 2016 and has reached its final stages, may have finally been completed. Furthermore, bilateral ties may have been upgraded from an “Innovative Comprehensive Partnership” to the strategic level, similar to what happened with China and Palestine when President Mahmoud Abbas visited Beijing in June 2023.
Ambassador Cai would have then expanded on his People's Daily article from January 2022, which celebrated the "thousand years of friendship" between Chinese and Jewish people.
Chinese state media would probably have waxed poetic about "Jewish wisdom" and the “start-up nation,” highlighting Israel's "strategic autonomy" over its alliance with an unreliable America rather than spreading antisemitic conspiracy theories.
This lack of agency is consistent with current studies on the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs's diminished status under Xi Jinping. The ministry and its diplomats are frequently portrayed as having little room to maneuver on policy and being forced to strictly adhere to orders coming from Beijing. Several Israeli officials and business executives who had dealings with the Chinese ambassador told me how they had experienced his limited capacity firsthand.
However, seeing Ambassador Cai solely as a passive actor is misleading. As Václav Havel observed, Chinese cadres are simultaneously victims of the party-state they serve as well as the pillars holding the system in place.
This duality is crucial to understanding his promotion: Cai is the quintessential ambassador of Xi’s “new era,” embodying the party man first and a diplomat second. Sometimes the tension between the two roles results in paralysis, or inaction, as a result of fear of retaliation for deviating from the “core leader’s” set path.
Moreover, “Xiplomacy” prioritizes political loyalty over professionalism. Ambassador Cai came to Israel with no background in Middle Eastern studies, nor does he speak English - Though he understands it, he always speaks Mandarin, accompanied by a translator. In official meetings, he rigidly reads the party’s talking points from a physical script and never deviates.
His unwavering loyalty was evident when he refrained - even in closed meetings - from condemning Hamas terrorism, mentioning the hostages, or sympathizing with his Israeli interlocutors. The embassy snubbed Netanyahu's personal appeal to Cai in December to help secure the release of hostage Noa Argamani, whose late mother, Liora Argamani, was born in Wuhan and was dying of cancer.
Even something as simple as condemning the unprecedented rise of antisemitism and the promotion of terrorism against the Jewish state on Chinese social media and state channels following October 7 was out of his reach.
One would think that in the wake of the largest slaughter of Jews since the Holocaust, he would denounce these horrific displays of racism. But every time the subject is brought up, Ambassador Cai reiterates the party's unwavering position that “antisemitism doesn't exist in China.” Next question, please.
While he frequently spoke about friendships, he didn’t come to make friends. Since October 7, Ambassador Cai has addressed the Israeli public only twice. First, in a tone-deaf newspaper article, he praised the current state of the Chinese economy and encouraged Israeli cooperation. Second, he recently held gatherings with select elites with whom he discussed “Israel's adherence to the one-China principle” over Taiwan.
With 66% of respondents favoring China, Israel was the country with the most pro-China sentiment in the 2019 Pew survey, only trailing Nigeria, Lebanon, and Russia. The embassy blamed the sharp decline in the 2023 poll on COVID-19 lockdowns, US pressure, and Western media—everyone and everything was at fault except China.
Because of his introversion and the language barrier, Ambassador Cai was less likely than his counterparts to engage in "wolf warrior diplomacy," which involves assertively defending China's "core interests" and responding to any perceived slights or criticisms from other nations.
The term nevertheless aptly describes the "tempest in a thermal cup" in April 2022, when Israeli media reported that the Chinese embassy had gifted ministers thermal cups with spying devices. Although routine security checks cleared the suspicion, the embassy escalated the issue into a diplomatic incident. They claimed the reports were "baseless rumors [that] have a severe impact as they aim to drive a wedge between China and Israel, tarnish China’s image, and seriously mislead the public."
In another incident a few weeks later, the embassy issued a warning letter to the editor of the Jerusalem Post, threatening to sever ties with the newspaper and “downgrade diplomatic relations with Israel” - no less - if they did not remove an interview with then-Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu. Naturally, the Israeli press and policymakers did not take kindly to this attempt to intimidate the free press.
What Can the EU Expect?
Ambassador Cai leaves a legacy of Chinese pragmatism combined with unwavering loyalty to the party. In areas where Beijing sees clear benefits to itself, such as economic cooperation and tech transfers, Brussels will find an effective and willing partner.
On other matters, however, the EU can only expect to be let down. Specifically, the EU should not anticipate a change in China's support for Russia under Cai's leadership, just as Israel's attempts to persuade Beijing on issues related to Iran and Hamas were met with an impenetrable brick wall.
As a career party diplomat, Cai is deeply familiar with the United Front system and its tactics. He is likely to engage with "old friends" and co-opt elites while sidelining and undermining critics of China.
In this respect, Europe will be seen through the prism of China's broader strategic rivalry with the "US-led West," much like Israel. However, should a second Trump administration come to pass, the new envoy might leverage this opportunity to exacerbate trans-Atlantic divisions and portray Washington as an unreliable partner.
Ultimately, China’s new ambassador in Brussels will be defined not by diplomatic charm but by a relentless pursuit of party-state interests, as Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy mandates that it is far wiser for the host country to be dissatisfied than for Beijing.
Discourse Power is written by Tuvia Gering, a researcher at the Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation Israel-China Policy Center at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) and a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Any views expressed in this newsletter, as well as any errors, are solely those of the author. Follow Tuvia on X @GeringTuvia
Despite Hamas's terror attacks against civilians??
After 70 years of 'civilian' terror attacks on helpless Palestinians?